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The long-term impact on income inequality of agricultural commercial spe-cialization is still an open-ended discussion. Diverse economic models and ap-proaches offer competing views, while historians increasingly stress the con-
tingent nature of the paths followed in the various contexts. Applying common inequality
indices like the Theil index along with new ones such as the inequality possible fron-
tier (IPF) and Inequality Extraction Ratios (IER), this study examines how wine-
growing specialization in Catalonia correlated with agricultural income distribution
in the municipalities of the province of Barcelona during the mid-nineteenth century.
This analysis examines a large dataset assembled from over 86,000 cadastral taxpayers
in 292 municipalities and recorded in the Distribution of Personal Wealth in Real Es-
tate Ownership of the province of Barcelona in 1852, combined with other population
and land use data listed in the Estadística territorial de la provincia de Barcelona
(Land Use Statistics of the Province of Barcelona), compiled in 1858. The results con-
firm that inequality in agricultural income distribution was lower in predominantly
winegrowing municipalities than in timber and cereal-growing ones, despite the fact that
commercial specialization and higher population densities could have extended the in-
equality possible frontier of those winegrowing areas in the mid-nineteenth century.
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Perfiles de la desigualdad rural y los usos del suelo en la
provincia de Barcelona a mediados del siglo XIX
PALABRAS CLAVE: distribución de los ingresos agrarios, propiedad
de la tierra, patrones de uso del suelo, presión fiscal.
CÓDIGOS JEL: N53, D31, H24, Q15.
El impacto sobre la desigualdad de ingresos de los procesos de especialización co-mercial agrícola es un tema de investigación abierto. Diversos enfoques y mo-delos económicos difieren, mientras los historiadores subrayan el carácter con-
tingente de las trayectorias seguidas en distintos contextos. Vamos a estudiar cómo la
especialización vitivinícola catalana se correlaciona con la distribución del ingreso agra-
rio en los municipios de la provincia de Barcelona a mediados del siglo XIX, mediante
indicadores de desigualdad habituales como el índice de Theil, junto con otros nuevos
como la frontera de máxima desigualdad posible (IPF) y las tasas de extracción de la
desigualdad (IER). Aplicamos este análisis a una base de datos con más de 86.000 con-
tribuyentes de 292 municipios registrados en la Distribución Personal de la Riqueza
Territorial en la provincia de Barcelona en 1852, combinados con datos de población
y uso del suelo de la Estadística territorial de la provincia de Barcelona, de 1858.
Los resultados confirman que la desigualdad en la distribución del ingreso agrario era
menor en los municipios vitícolas que en los principalmente forestales o cerealícolas, aun-
que la especialización y mayor densidad de población de las zonas vitícolas podrían ha-
ber ampliado la frontera de máxima desigualdad a mediados del siglo XIX.
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1. INTRODUCTION
What impact does agricultural commercial specialization entail on income inequality?
There is no clear consensus in the literature to answer this question. To begin with, if mar-
ket integration leads to a rise in total income and wealth in a region, this would also in-
volve an upward shift of the maximum inequality possibility frontier, which in turn might
lead to an increase in the actual extraction ratio taken by a small elite (Milanovic, 2011;
Milanovic, Lindert & Williamson, 2011). Whether the latter happens or not depends on
other factors at stake and, when considering them, diverse economic approaches and
models differ (Williamson, 1991, 1999, 2009; O’Rourke & Williamson, 1999; Bour-
guignon & Morrisson, 2002; Lindert & Williamson, 2003; Piketty, Postel-Vinay &
Rosenthal, 2006; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Atkinson & Piketty, 2007; Hornborg, Mc-
Neill & Martínez Alier, 2007; Prados de la Escosura, 2008; Roine & Waldenström, 2009;
Piketty, 2014). For example, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem states that under a
Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade, a rise in the relative price of a good will lead to an in-
crease in the return to the factor that is used most intensively in the production of the
good traded, and to a fall in the return to the other factors less intensively used. Yet, this
does not apply when a commercial specialisation sets in motion the advance of an agri-
cultural frontier that extends the cropland area of the commodity being grown and sold
abroad –at least as long as the frontier remains open (Greasley, Inwood & Singleton,
2007; Harley, 2007; Santiago-Caballero, 2011; Badia-Miró & Tello, 2014). These ex-
amples stress the importance of several contingent historical factors that frame how the
disputed entitlement of natural resources affects who benefits from their use (Badia-Miró,
Pinilla & Willebald, 2015).
The discussion above makes it very relevant to study how the agricultural specializa-
tion in brandies and wines that took place in Catalonia since the mid-17th century to the
Phylloxera plague in the late 19th century affected income inequality (Vilar, 1962; Giralt,
1965; Valls-Junyent, 2004; Badia-Miró & Tello, 2014; Colomé et al., 2016). Many his-
torical monographs have pointed out that the spread of vineyards in this north-eastern
corner of the Iberian Peninsula led to a less unequal rural society (Garrabou, Tello &
Cussó, 2008; Garrabou et al., 2009; Badia-Miró & Tello, 2014; Tello & Badia-Miró, 2015).
Nevertheless, most available evidence comes from cadastral sources which, in most
cases, did not make a clear distinction between landownership rents and the incomes ob-
tained by winegrowers who were holders of tenancy contracts. This is an important short-
coming which may have led to overestimate the actual reduction in income inequality
(Valls-Junyent, 1997; Colomé, 2013; López Estudillo, 2016). Using a large dataset as-
sembled through an unexploited source on agricultural incomes recorded in the province
of Barcelona in mid-19th century, we therefore test the hypothesis put forward by previ-
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ous local case studies that the Catalan vineyard specialization led to a reduction of in-
equality in agrarian income distribution (Tello, Garrabou & Cussó, 2006; Colomé,
Planas & Valls-Junyent, 2015). 
According to the available case studies, there would have been two specific mechanisms
at stake, one direct and another indirect. The direct mechanism was the leasing of small
plots of land from well-off landowners to landless winegrowers through a traditional share-
cropping contract called in Catalan rabassa morta (Badia-Miró et al., 2010; Badia-Miró
& Tello, 2014; Carmona & Simpson, 1999; Garrido, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c). The tenancy
established by this peculiar long-lease emphyteutic contract lasted until the death of the
vines planted by the tenant. Given that before the Phylloxera plague winegrowers used to
bury strains of their old vines in order to keep them alive, the rabassa tenants tried to main-
tain their access to land almost permanently. The duration of the contract, together with
the rent share taken by the landowner from the vintage harvested by the winegrower, gave
rise to a long-lasting class conflict from the end of the 18th century until the Spanish Civil
War in 1936-39 (Balcells, 1980; Valls-Junyent, 1997; Tello, 1997; Carmona & Simpson,
1999; Simpson, 2011; Colomé, 2013; Colomé et al., 2016). Despite the conflicting so-
cial relationship between landowners and tenants, the fact that the rabassa tenancy sys-
tem became so widespread might also be acknowledged as an achievement by the poor-
est sections of the Catalan rural society thanks to their bargaining power and collective
action (Garrabou, Planas & Saguer, 2001a; Garrabou & Tello, 2002). 
The second indirect mechanism through which vineyard specialization could have led
to a reduction in landownership and agrarian income inequalities was the ability of many
rabassa tenants to subsist from their vines, endure the pressure of the rent taken by the
owner, and prosper enough to buy a small house, an adjoining garden and even a plot of
their own. It is important to note that many of these landless tenants were immigrants ini-
tially coming from Southern France and the mountain villages of the Pyrenees (Nadal &
Giralt, 1960). Some others, however, came from the non-inheriting progeny of the same
class of well-off peasants who offered them rabassa tenancies. Furthermore, as non-heirs,
they received a legitimate compensation from the first-born brother heir, which was paid
either in cash or with a small plot of land. This second mechanism restrained landown-
ership inequality, while the spread of rabassa tenancies only reduced the inequality of in-
come distribution. Taken together, both mechanisms entailed an improvement of access
to land and agrarian incomes that the rabassa tenants managed to achieve in winegrow-
ing municipalities. These options were not so available to the poorest sectors of Catalan
rural society in mainly cereal-growing, forest and livestock-grazing areas. In this sense, we
may say that Catalan winegrowing tenants managed to harness the ongoing process of
population growth, commercial specialization and agricultural intensification to carry out
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a genuine process of socioeconomic empowerment (Badia-Miró & Tello, 2014; Tello &
Badia-Miró, 2015).
The most apparent feature of agrarian settlement in most of the province was a net-
work of scattered poly-cultural farms called masies in Catalan, structured into compact
land units around an isolated rural dwelling. Thanks to the late medieval peasant strug-
gles held in Catalonia before and after the Black Death, the well-off landowners who lived
in these masies gradually gained control of the rights of access to cropped and unculti-
vated land over a complex and conflictive transition from feudalism to agrarian capital-
ism (Garrabou, Tello & Cussó, 2008; Congost, 2015). From the 17th century onwards,
population growth was fostered by increasing French immigrants and higher fertility. The
owners of the scattered farms saw these immigrants, and the disinherited descendants of
the old local families, as a new and frightening landless class that tried to settle down in
the villages or towns between their networks of masies.
However, landowners soon discovered new opportunities to take advantage of the lack
of land and labour availability of this landless class, and of the high relative prices of brandy
or wine at that time, by expanding the inner winegrowing frontier and leasing to them some
marginal lands to plant vineyards (Colomé et al., 2013). Many landless families became
winegrowers through the emphyteutic rabassa contract, and a new social geography ap-
peared when a patchwork of small vineyard plots arose among the interstices of the old poly-
cultural masies (Marull et al., 2010; Olarieta, Rodríguez Valle & Tello, 2008; Tello, Garrabou
& Cussó, 2006). This poorest share of population used to live in the streets of small towns
or villages. While the shape of the diverse compact fields of every masia tended to be higher
and be located around a scattered farmhouse, the small plots of vineyards planted by the
rabassers used to be orientated towards the old villages, or even to the new ones created
by these winegrowers, following the existing ways and roads (Garrabou, Tello & Cussó,
2008; Colomé, Cucurella-Jorba & Valls-Junyent, 2010; Colomé & Valls-Junyent, 2012).
Some local case studies on these vine-growing municipalities have shown a decrease
in the Gini coefficients of landownership distribution from the beginning of the 18th cen-
tury up to the Phylloxera plague (Garrabou, Tello & Cussó, 2008; Garrabou et al.,
2009). Later, when every old vine had been ravaged during the 1880s, all the rabassa con-
tracts came to an end, and many tenants were evicted or gave up winegrowing, landown-
ership distribution became more unequal again. In other areas, however, vineyards were
replanted; many rabassa tenancies persisted, and with them the conflicts about the rent
shares and land entitlements lasted another half a century up to the Spanish Civil War and
Franco’s dictatorship (Badia-Miró et al., 2010; Colomé, 2013; Colomé et al., 2016). Any-
way, could this pathway be generalized assuming that the reduction in inequality of the
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rural Catalan society up to mid-19th century was a general trend triggered by the spread
of vineyard specialization?
We can find in the existing literature on the Catalan vineyard specialization some trends
which might have counterbalanced the factors listed above that favoured a less unequal
rural society (Colomé et al., 2013). First, commercial specialization could attract more
immigrants to the municipalities where vineyards were spreading, and also foster popu-
lation growth in them by increasing birth rates, thus growing the number of people who
owned only very small plots or had no land of their own (Valls-Junyent, 1997; Colomé
et al., 2010). Secondly, the spread of vineyards also raised the total income and wealth
of the whole rural community. As Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2011) have
pointed out, a wealthier economy could also mean the possibility to increase the extrac-
tion ratio taken by a small elite. Thirdly, many historical examples do show that an increase
in market integration and globalization have led to greater inequality and not the oppo-
site (Hornborg, McNeill & Martínez Alier, 2007). Even adopting a standard Heckscher-
Ohlin approach, this could be the expected outcome when land was still the most abun-
dant factor endowment in a region joining a global market (Acemoglu, Robinson &
Johnson, 2002; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006).
2. INEQUALITY OF WHAT, AND AMONG WHOM?
Having these historical and theoretical considerations in mind, we cannot take for
granted that the reduction of inequality in landownership or agrarian incomes was a gen-
eral trend in the province of Barcelona, without carrying out a cross-section analysis en-
compassing a great deal of municipalities. To do this, we have employed as a main source
the Distribution of Personal Wealth in Real Estate Ownership published in the Official
Gazette of the Barcelona province in 1852. This very exceptional document lists for each
of the municipalities the names of all owners of land, houses and livestock who were sub-
ject to payment of the cadastral tax, adding up the monetary evaluation of their taxable
incomes and annual tax burden paid. Drawn from this source, we have been able to in-
clude in our database more than 86,000 taxpayers in 292 municipalities for which we also
had data on the land use patterns, out of the 311 existing at present in the province. These
real estate owners represented 12% of the total population, 24% of all males, and 41%
of all male inhabitants older than 21 recorded in the provincial census of 1857. The sec-
ond main source used in our database is a Land-Use Statistics of the Province of
Barcelona compiled in 1858 by a Spanish topographer, Pedro Moreno Ramírez
(2011[1858]), which lists the total agrarian area and the extent occupied for each agri-
cultural, forest or pastureland use in each municipality. This information has been com-
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bined with the 1857 population census, so as to construct a dataset to correlate the land
use profiles and agrarian income inequality in 292 municipalities of the province of
Barcelona in mid-19th century.
The Distribution of Personal Wealth in Real Estate Ownership of 1852 is a very ex-
ceptional source. According to the Royal Order issued by the then Managing Director of
Taxes, Statistics and State Heritage, all Spanish provinces had to publish in their Official
Gazettes the whole list of taxpayers with their names, the taxes they paid, and tax bur-
den applied (Bravo, 1852). Such unusual transparency can only be understood in the con-
text of the initial efforts to legitimate a modern land tax system to be developed by the
Spanish liberal governments after the new Tax Act passed in 1845. Unfortunately, these
efforts failed to achieve their ultimate goals for over a century. During the 19th century
and the first third of the 20th century the Spanish liberal governments never ended the
cadastral maps and enquiries needed to assess an income value for each land unit devoted
to a specific crop, so as to apply a uniform tax burden to every taxpayer (Muro, Nadal &
Urteaga, 1996).
Due to the Spanish long-lasting failure in completing a true cadastral survey, a tem-
porary tax system called amillaramientos was established. Instead of following a bottom
up process to comply with the most basic principle of tax equity, the system of amil-
laramientos ran top to bottom. Each year the provincial quotas were politically dis-
tributed in the Spanish Parliament, and then each provincial quota was politically shared
out between municipalities by provincial governors. It was only at municipal level where
the already given amount of taxes to be paid was distributed among taxpayers according
to the estimated cadastral value of their property and derived income (Carrasco, 1867).
The Distribution of Personal Wealth in Real Estate Ownership clearly demonstrated that
the tax burden applied to different municipalities of the Barcelona province in 1852 var-
ied a lot, from twelve up to more than twenty per cent of the local aggregated income.
Although some historians have used some partial information taken from these provin-
cial lists (Díez Espinosa, 1986; Segura, 1993; Díaz Marín, 2000; Calatayud, Millán &
Romeo, 2000; Burgueño, 2007), this is the first time that a large dataset is created and
fully analysed using the whole information they contain.
Unfortunately, this exceptional source also entails a very important ambiguity in the
economic data provided. The primary information contained in the local amillaramien-
tos referred to the surfaces of land owned by each taxpayer, together with their houses and
livestock. Clearly, this was information on the distribution of agrarian wealth. Owing to
other contemporary sources (Peña, 1852; Carrasco, 1867) we know the specific methods
that had to be used by the Finance officials to estimate in money terms an average yearly
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income from the cadastral information on personal properties recorded in physical units.
However, only these final cadastral estimates of annual incomes were published in the Dis-
tribution of Personal Wealth in Real Estate Ownership of 1852. This is understandable,
considering the aim to assess the tax burden variation among different taxpayers and mu-
nicipalities of the same province. But it requires us to deal with the resulting ambiguity:
Are we calculating inequalities of wealth or income? It is well known that inequality of
wealth is always greater than income inequality (Van Zanden, 1995). While people
should at least be able to survive with the latter, real estate property was the result of a
long-lasting accumulation that could only be carried out by those having higher incomes
(Shenk et al., 2010).
Since only the cadastral estimated revenues from land, houses and livestock were in-
cluded, we cannot take this income information as if it had recorded all sorts of agrarian
earnings. In addition, this information on rural earnings was given by means of an esti-
mated average income that any landowner or tenant could obtain yearly from their prop-
erties, according to the standardized procedures applied by the cadastral officials. Sur-
prisingly enough, the Gini coefficients obtained from this indirect data on personal
agrarian incomes are rather similar to the ones directly calculated from the distribution
of landownership measured in surface units from the local amillaramientos. This coinci-
dence might have something to do with the existence of proportionality between the dis-
tributions of wealth and rents paid for housing (Peña, 1852), in the same vein as some
economists of the time had alleged in order to propose using the data on rental housing
as an easy proxy for personal income (San Julián, 2011).
In any case, the way of accounting the estimated agrarian incomes and wealth intro-
duces and important bias in our dataset. A relevant share of all taxpayers included in the
lists had only a very poor house of their own. Their recorded incomes were the implicit
rent that could have been obtained by leasing these poor houses in the market, after hav-
ing deduced a quarter of the rent as repair costs. Some others could also be sharecrop-
pers, either as rabassa winegrowing tenants living in a village or as sharecropping fami-
lies who, according to another typical Catalan contract called masoveria, had to live in
the farmhouse where they worked for the owner of the mas. In this case, the cadastral val-
uation had to include the sharecropper’s net income, obtained by deducting from their
annual earnings the rent paid to the landowner (Peña, 1852). It is far from certain, how-
ever, that this rule had been always followed in the local cadastral registers (amil-
laramientos) from where our data comes from.
The Distribution of Personal Wealth in Real Estate Ownership of 1852 includes a great
deal of very poor taxpayers with only rather incomplete incomes, because they were be-
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low the lowest male agricultural wage at the time and no one could have survived with
such a low yearly earning. According to the available series of Catalan agricultural wages
for unskilled tasks, like digging, during the five years between 1850 and 1854 an agri-
cultural labourer who worked 260 days a year would earn an income of some 1,720 Span-
ish reales in the province of Barcelona (Garrabou & Tello, 2002). The urban planner Ilde-
fons Cerdà calculated the prevailing family budgets in Barcelona at the time in around
6,622 reales for a full working-class family (Cerdà, 1867). This means that at least three
to four male adult unskilled wages like the ones considered would have had to be added
up in order to achieve the minimum standard of living calculated by Cerdà. The cost of
living was cheaper outside Barcelona, but this data reveals that between 1,500 to 2,000
reales could be considered a minimum income to survive at the time. However, the list
of taxpayers of 1852 included a lot of people below that level (see Table A1 in the An-
nex). An astonishing 84-87% appeared in the document with a cadastral attributed in-
come under the abovementioned poverty line of 1,500-2,000 reales a year.
Although this 87% of people who had such a small property worth less than 2,000
reales a year only owned 27% of all income recorded, they actually paid 30% of all cadas-
tral taxes collected in the province. If we set aside the outlier case of Barcelona city, in most
rural municipalities the proportion of taxes paid by taxpayers with an attributed income
lower than 2,000 reales ranged from 32 to 50%. Even assuming that such poor taxpay-
ers had endured exactly the same tax rate as the very rich, the prevailing tax system would
have been very regressive. Our data show that they always bore an even higher tax bur-
den (see Table A2 in the Annex). This clearly explains why the wealthy rural elites were
so interested in including such a great amount of poor people in the taxpayers’ list. In this
way, the Spanish Treasure could raise a lot by extracting a bit from many taxpayers who
only earned very little. Insofar as the tax quotas of each province and municipality came
as given by previous political decisions taken top-down from the parliament and provin-
cial governors, the relevant share paid by the poorest contributors became tax cuts for the
local wealthy landowners.
While the vast majority of poor taxpayers were only attributed with cadastral earnings
ranging from several tens to some hundreds of reales, and paid taxes for a few tens to less
than a real per year, the small group of the richest taxpayers owned rural properties worth
tens of thousands reales, and paid taxes for several thousand reales a year. In an electoral
system based on the taxes paid, only major taxpayers were entitled to vote. We wonder
whether the Spanish tax system described above might have something to do with the
granting of voting rights to the entire adult male population as early as 1890; and also,
consequently, with the immediate corruption of this general male suffrage by the so called
Spanish caciquismo (Moreno Luzón, 2007). The anomalous tax system based on a po-
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litical top-down allocation of cadastral quotas established, in fact, a perverse rule of the
game encouraging the creation of vertical lobbies to get the minimum local tax share to
be paid to the Treasure, and receive the maximum public expenditure in each province
and municipality (Curto-Grau, Herranz-Loncán & Solé-Ollé, 2012).
In any case, the inclusion of so many people owning only a house, and perhaps a veg-
etable garden, together with landless tenants with very low yearly earnings, clearly biases
our dataset. However, their presence also provides valuable information. We will later ex-
plain the adjustments we made to deal with these ambiguities in order to try to account
for inequality in this agrarian income distribution. Before resuming with our analysis, we
must finally refer to another concern raised by this kind of historical source. What cred-
ibility can we give to the information it contains, given the tax purpose of the document?
Our research team has worked for many years using the private accounting records of the
patrimony of the Marquis of Sentmenat, one of the richest Catalan landowners of the time.
From his private records, we know that during the five years between 1850 and 1854 the
Marquis earned in the two municipalities of Sentmenat and Palau-solità i Plegamans an
actual average income of 12,047 and 15,983 reales a year respectively (Garrabou, Planas
& Saguer, 2001b). The Distribution of Personal Wealth in Real Estate Ownership of 1852
attributed to the Marquis of Sentmenat a yearly cadastral income of 11,607 and 15,323
reales in the same municipalities: this means a downward deviation of only 3.9%. The com-
parison increased our trust in the accuracy of the information provided by this source.
3. SEARCHING FOR INEQUALITY PATTERNS
After mapping inequality indices, and unlike what happens with land-use spatial patterns
(Garrabou et al., 2009: 156), no apparent coincidence seems to appear in the spatial dis-
tribution of the prevailing inequality of agrarian incomes earned from real estate owner-
ship. Often, the differences between neighbouring municipalities located in the same zone
of land-use specialization were as pronounced as the ones observed among the major
boundaries between land use areas of winegrowing, cereal-cropping, and woodland (see
Figure 1). 
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FIGURE 1
Theil indices of inequality in the municipalities
of the province of Barcelona, 1852
Source: our own, from the Distribution of Personal Wealth in Real Estate Ownership of 1852 (Library of
the Universitat de Barcelona, reference 146-1-II/13).
Theil indices have been obtained from the dataset of income cadastral values recorded
for every taxpayer included in each municipality (see the methodological supplementary
material) in the following way: 
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where Ni is the number of observations in each municipality i, xi,j each one of the indi-
vidual observations of the annual incomes for every municipality, and is the mean value
of the distribution for each municipality. The Theil index shows less inequality as values
tend to zero and more inequality as values tend to one. Theil values correct the potential
bias attributable to the wide range of variation in the number of taxpayers and inhabitants
in different municipalities. Table 1 shows the main statistics for the Theil index and other
inequality indices.
TABLE 1
Main statistics for the various inequality index of the database
on 1852 taxpayers in the municipalities of the province of Barcelona
Theil Mean log deviation Gini
Number 292 292 292
Mean 0.202 1.016 0.668
Standard deviation 0.073 0.391 0.105
Median 0.201 0.958 0.682
Max 0.429 2.566 0.873
Min 0.018 0.071 0.193
Source: our own, from the Distribution of Personal Wealth in Real Estate Ownership of 1852 (Library of
the Universitat de Barcelona, reference 146-1-II/13).
TABLE 2
Comparison between the main statistics of the database on the number of taxpayers
in 1852 and of inhabitants in 1857 in the municipalities of the province of Barcelona
Taxpayers in 1852 Inhabitants in 1857
Maximum 9,616 235,643
Minimum 17 211
Mean 297 2,396
Median 205 979
Source: our own, from the Distribution of Personal Wealth in Real Estate Ownership of 1852 (Library of
the Universitat de Barcelona, reference 146-1-II/13) and population census of 1857 (available at
http://www.ced.uab.es/index.php?newlang=eng).
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The dispersion of Theil indices, and the existence of two peaks, lead us to seek for a few
complementary explanations. As we have seen, our dataset is highly heterogeneous. For
example, we find a maximum population of 235,643 inhabitants in the city of Barcelona,
together with many municipalities having a minimum below 300 inhabitants. At the same
time, some municipalities had an important percentage of taxpayers while in other cases
the percentage was lower, thus indicating the necessity for a deeper statistical analysis
(Table 2).
TABLE 3
Main characteristics of the groups resulting from the cluster analysis
of the municipalities of the province of Barcelona, 1858
Group N Density(inhab/km2) Vineyard Forestry Cereal Distance to BCN (hour)
1 15 Very high Very high Low Low Very near
2 30 Average Very high Low Low Near
3 5 Very high High Very Low Very high Very near
4 20 Average Low Low Very high Average
5 8 Very high Average Low Very high Near
6 20 Low Very low Very high Low Very far
7 51 Low High Average Low Near
8 37 Low Low High Low Near
9 14 Low Very Low High High Far
10 48 Very low Very low High Low Far
11 26 Average Average Average High Near
12 18 Low Very high Very low High Average
N 292 135.8 24.4% 52.2% 20.6% 12.0
Source: our own from Moreno Ramírez (2011[1858]).
In order to check the relationship between Theil inequality indices and the main land use
patterns of the municipalities, we have repeated the analysis of the basic statistics split-
ting these municipalities considering groups based on statistically rigorous thresholds. The
dataset has been split off according to similarity criteria considering cluster analysis from
the percentage of winegrowing and cereal-cropping over total agricultural land, forest area
over the total area of each municipality, the population density and the distance to
Barcelona. To do that we carried out a non-hierarchical clustering with the number of
groups obtained from a hierarchical clustering estimation1. The information of munici-
pal land uses has been taken from the 1858 Land-Use Statistics of the Province of
1. Considering Ward’s linkage cluster analysis and assuming that we observe few changes when ob-
serving the Calinski-Harabasz pseudo-F coefficient after 12 groups. 
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Barcelona compiled by Pedro Moreno Ramírez (2011[1858]). The resulting categories
were 12. Table 3 summarizes the main characteristics of each group.
Figure 2 shows the differences in inequality indices (means) by groups, and their stan-
dard deviations, ordering the groups from lowest to highest inequality.
FIGURE 2
Theil indices by groups of the database on the number of taxpayers according to
cluster land-use groups in the municipalities of the province of Barcelona, 1852-58
Source: our own, from the same historical sources referred in Figure 1 and Table 3.
According to Figure 2, the least unequal municipalities where those with a high share of
vineyards, low share of forestry and cereal land, and close to Barcelona with either aver-
age population density (group 2) or high densities (group 1). Conversely, those more un-
equal municipalities had higher shares of cereal with low density (group 9 and 12), higher
share of forestry with low density and low share of vineyards (group 8, 9 and 10), and high
share of cereal land in municipalities close to Barcelona (group 11).
When comparing averages among groups we found the existence of statistical differ-
ences, specifically among group 1 and 2 in the one side and group 10, 11 and 12 on the
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other side2. Furthermore, distances among mean and median warns us about the likely
existence of non-normal distributions in the dataset. This first outcome leads us to ask
about the underlying reasons for the complex spatial inequality pattern found in the
province of Barcelona in mid-19th century, and the best statistical way to deal with this.
Taking into account the characteristics of the available information, and the abovemen-
tioned biases existing in the dataset, we can outline a list of five likely factors that may have
obscured these initial results:
a) There were no large areas of monoculture in the province of Barcelona. Almost
all municipalities combined different proportions of all land uses. The very dif-
ferent size of municipalities, and the absence of large flat areas, involved the ex-
istence of many contrasting realities in the land uses prevailing within each
place. In particular, the larger and more populous municipalities always com-
bined cereal crops in the flattest lands with forest uses in the more slopping
ones, and vineyards planted in intermediate slopes. Thus, we have never a
“pure” winegrowing municipality clearly detached from other totally devoted
to cereal or forest uses.
b) As explained, the database includes only taxpayers who had some real estate
of their own. That means excluding some people deprived of property who, in
many cases, obtained most or all of their incomes through wages earned by
working in agriculture. At the same time, however, the database includes a large
proportion of taxpayers only owing a poor house and a small vegetable garden,
or having a sharecropping contract. If a significant number of adults deprived
of property were unevenly distributed between municipalities with different
land usages, this may introduce another bias in our database.
c) The simultaneous presence of wealthy landowners and well-off peasants along
with a high proportion of landless residents who only held a poor house with
garden, or could rely on sharecropping contracts, involves mixing very differ-
ent realities in the same database. The resulting distribution seems to move in
different orders of magnitude. As explained, this is largely the outcome of am-
biguous data which is halfway between a distribution of land ownership and a
distribution of agrarian income. To make it more coherent, either all types of
income are included in the database or all attributed cadastral earnings should
be converted into the original valuation of real estate property.
2. An ANOVA test shows a F-statistics=4.20 and p=0.001<0.05 accepting the existence of diffe-
rences among means.
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d) The municipalities were not only very different in size, but also in population
and wealth. As population density increased, so did the number of residents who
made their living with activities that had little or nothing to do with land and
livestock ownership. In this point, the contrast between rural towns, villages and
the city matters. Barcelona becomes a special case that for our purpose has to
be set aside as an outlier.
e) Inequality in the distribution of agrarian incomes within each municipality also
depended on its level of wealth. Poorer areas could have lower inequality indices
just because people had to achieve at least a subsistence minimum. However,
the frontier of maximum inequality rose along with the wealth of a rural com-
munity. Consequently, the comparisons of inequality between municipalities
should take into account their respective levels of the inequality possible fron-
tier (IPF) and Inequality Extraction Ratio (IER).
In order to solve these difficulties, and improve our quantitative analysis, we will un-
dertake in the next sections a deeper analysis of rural income inequality by including a
level of subsistence income, using the frontier of maximum inequality linked to the wealth
of each community (IPF), and comparing it with the inequality registered (IER).
4. A DEEPER ANALYSIS OF AGRARIAN INCOME INEQUALITY
Now we will try to deal with the double bias encountered, due to the fact that the original
dataset only includes taxpayers, not the entire rural population who earned incomes from
agrarian activities; and also, that many of these taxpayers appear with implausible incomes
below the minimum subsistence level. The first bias reduces and the second one increases
the inequality level, and without knowing their relative weight we cannot guess how they
may skew the results obtained from this database. To correct the first bias, we have sub-
tracted from the population figures in the census of 1857 the number of owners included
in the lists of taxpayers of 1852, in order to then add to the original database the adult male
population without any land, house or cattle of their own. They will be taken as a zero group
in the valuation of property in each municipality. Afterwards, so as to turn the ambiguous
dataset on personal wealth into a clearer distribution of agrarian incomes, we have added
a minimum vital income of 1,500 reales a year –considered to be obtained from wages or
earnings other than land, housing and livestock rents– to the earning valuation of property
held by all inhabitants included in the new dataset. As explained, this flat vital income is
obtained considering the unskilled daily wage of a Catalan labourer at the time multiplied
by 260 working days a year (see the methodological supplementary material).
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Unfortunately, these two changes will entail some disadvantages as well. The major
drawback is that all inequality levels resulting from the new dataset are lower than the orig-
inal ones, as expected. Taking this strong shift towards a more even distribution into ac-
count, from now on we can only consider significant the relative differences between the
new Theil indices obtained in each municipality, not their absolute values. The key ques-
tion is how different the new distributions are from the previous ones obtained with only
taxpayers.
FIGURE 3
Theil indices of the corrected sample from the original dataset, according to cluster
land-use groups of the municipalities in the province of Barcelona, 1852-58
Source: our own, from the same historical sources referred in Figure 1 and Table 3.
In Figure 3 we see that group 1 and 2 remained as the least unequal municipalities. The
correction increases inequality in group 6 (with high share of forest, low population den-
sity and far from Barcelona), reinforces inequality in group 11 (high share of cereal and
close to Barcelona), and reduces inequality in other groups with a high share of vineyards:
1, 2 and 12 (the latter being the most unequal in the non-corrected sample). Differences
on means by different groups remained statically significant. It is clear that the omission
of non-taxpayers overestimated inequality levels in those municipalities with a high share
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of vineyards, and underestimated inequality levels in those municipalities with a high share
of forestland and low population densities.
5. ESTABLISHING THE INEQUALITY POSSIBILITY FRONTIER (IPF)
AND INEQUALITY EXTRACTION RATIO (IER)
After having incorporated the previous corrections and caveats in the calculation of Theil
indices, now we have to face the most difficult task. How the lack of a clear spatial pat-
tern found when comparing the land-use maps with inequality of rural income distribu-
tion can be overcome? It seems as if there was a greater historical contingency in the ge-
ographical patterns of agrarian income inequality (Figure 1) than in the geographical
distribution of prevailing land uses (Garrabou et al., 2009: 156). This might be due to di-
verging local paths. While the landowners of a municipality could have decided to keep
their forest and pasture lands exploited in a traditional manner, raising livestock and sell-
ing timber, firewood or charcoal, others might have chosen to establish a great deal of
rabassa tenants in them who transformed the same sorts of land into vineyards. These dif-
ferent occasional decisions could have reinforced themselves over time in neighbouring
areas, leading through path dependence and self-reinforcing trends to contrasting spatial
realities juxtaposed into the same territory. 
The main question that arises is whether we can find or not some key omitted vari-
ables which could capture and explain a great deal of this historical contingency. An im-
portant side of the question is that once the landowners of a place had decided to offer
or not an opportunity to establish immigrants or disinherited people as winegrowing ten-
ants in their lands, this would have entailed consequences for population sizes and levels
of wealth in each community as well. If there was any relationship between the level of
agrarian income inequality and the increase of wealth attained through a high investment
in land improvement in a rural community, this could provide an interesting way to cap-
ture the disturbing degree of local contingency we found. This is why we decided to ac-
count for the inequality possibility frontier (thereinafter, IPF) that depends upon the level
of economic development and agrarian wealth, as put forward by Milanovic, Lindert and
Williamson (2011). When the wealth of a community increases so does the IPF, which
may generate a greater distance between the vast majorities kept at subsistence level and
a tiny elite able to concentrate the rest of income.
Therefore, we are going to use the IPF in order to calculate new inequality indices of
personal agrarian income adjusted to different levels of rural wealth (see the method-
ological supplementary material). The first step is to work out the maximum values of in-
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come inequality in each municipality. Following Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson
(2011), the average income of the elite is: 
where is the average income of the elite in a municipality i, TIi is the total income in
each municipality, is the subsistence income in each municipality, Ni is the total adult
male population and εi is the number of persons that represents the elite also in this mu-
nicipality. 
To obtain the Theil index for the IPF (T*) of each municipality, we consider equation
(1). The local population is divided into two groups, the first one with the subsistence in-
come (µs ) and the other with the income of the elite that obtains the rest of the surplus
of the municipality, as shown in equation (3).
Lastly, to make comparable this index with the rest of the values obtained for the entire
dataset we have normalized equation (3) dividing by ln (Ni). From the calculus of the
T* normalized we can obtain the inequality extraction ratio (IER thereinafter) for each
municipality, considering:
IER indicates the percentage of the inequality that existed in each municipality respect
to the IPF, which is the maximum potential of inequality possible with a defined value
= −( − )∗ = 1 [ − ( − ) ∗ ] (2)
]
(3)
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for εi, assuming ε = 1 (the elite is formed by one person), Ni is the value of the adult male
population of the municipality. When ER→ 0 the value indicates that the level of inequality
registered in the municipality was well below the potential frontier of maximum value of
inequality. In the other extreme, when ER → 100% the level of inequality obtained is close
to the level of maximum potential inequality. The results can be observed in Figure 4.
FIGURE 4
Inequality Extration Ration (IER) according to cluster land-use groups,
population densities and other features in the municipalities of the province
of Barcelona, 1852-58
TheilIPF indices of each municipality have been calculated considering the elite = 1. 
Source: our own, from the same historical sources referred in Figure 1 and Table 3.
Figure 4 and the summary of Table 4 confirm many of the previously reported results,
adding at the same time a novel perspective. Winegrowing municipalities near to Barcelona
(group 1 and 2) were further away from potential levels of inequality, while municipali-
ties with mainly forestland, low population densities and far from Barcelona (group 6 and
10) were closer to their maximum IPF. Another interesting result is that IER figures for
cereal crop municipalities near to Barcelona (group 11 and 12) now appear around the
mean, whereas former Theil values had shown higher inequality (both for corrected and
non-corrected estimations). 
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These changes in the ranks and levels of municipal inequality highlight the importance
of introducing the corrections considered in the dataset so as to obtain more revealing re-
sults. As can be seen, the figures for the other groups remained stable with non-signifi-
cant changes between IER and the former figures. ANOVA test confirms the existence
of statistical differences between the means of the groups in both extremes, that is group
2 as being the least unequal municipalities and group 6 and 10 as being the most unequal
municipalities (F=43.0).
TABLE 4
Extraction ratio (IER), Theil and Theil corrected with income of non-taxpayers,
according to cluster land-use groups, population densities and other features
in the municipalities of the province of Barcelona, 1852-58
Absolute values Mean = 100
Theil Theil - corrected IER Theil Theil - corrected IER
1 0.15 0.02 0.11 72.2 57.9 62.4
2 0.15 0.01 0.10 72.6 51.0 60.1
3 0.18 0.03 0.15 89.9 108.2 84.0
4 0.19 0.03 0.15 92.5 91.1 89.3
5 0.19 0.03 0.17 95.7 93.9 98.3
6 0.19 0.04 0.23 96.3 124.2 130.8
7 0.20 0.03 0.16 100.2 96.3 93.7
8 0.22 0.03 0.19 108.7 116.4 107.1
9 0.22 0.03 0.18 108.9 93.8 104.5
10 0.22 0.03 0.22 110.7 105.2 128.1
11 0.23 0.04 0.17 112.9 150.2 97.5
12 0.23 0.03 0.19 114.6 95.6 107.0
Average 0.20 0.03 0.17
Source: our own, from the same historical sources referred in Figure 1 and Table 2.
It is important to point out that this happens in spite of the fact of having previously in-
cluded in our database a flat vital minimum income for all male adults, which inevitably
entailed a compression of all Theil indices around very low absolute values of income in-
equality. The differences found become much more relevant when the abovementioned
bias is taken into account, allowing us to confirm that the study of income inequality us-
ing the IER approach is able to reveal some important hidden dimensions of the ques-
tion.
Table 4 summarizes the main results found with this statistical corrections and novel
methodological approaches. They confirm that, before the Phylloxera plague, vineyard spe-
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cialization was mainly performed in the province of Barcelona by poor landless peasants
who sought to earn their living working as emphyteutic tenants on the thin and sloping
soils leased to them by landowners. Nevertheless, this commercial specialization played
a key role by linking the area with the emerging Atlantic economies, and gave way to an
increase in population densities near the level of an urban-industrial society (Badia-Miró
et al., 2010; Badia-Miró & Tello, 2014). These figures also uphold our initial hypothesis
that agrarian income inequality was kept lower in municipalities where vine-growing was
carried out mixed with some degree of cereal cropping and forestry uses. This reduction
in income inequality took place notwithstanding the land improvements made by these
poor winegrowers, which increased the wealth of the whole rural community thus en-
hancing the frontier of a possible maximum inequality (IPF).
Indeed, the hard work of terracing poor sloping soils and planting vineyards was a huge
investment in land improvement (Olarieta, Rodríguez & Tello, 2008) which increased the
wealth of the entire rural community. How can this be reconciled with the fact that av-
erage income in winegrowing municipalities (group 1 and 2) appears to be the lowest in
Table 5? The distinction between agricultural income averages per person or unit of land
becomes a key issue here (see also Table 6 of the methodological supplementary mate-
rial). As can be seen in Table 5, income per unit of land was higher in winegrowing mu-
nicipalities than in forestry areas or cereal zones. Nevertheless, per capita averages were
lower in the former than the latter.
Catalan vineyards were either spread over former forest and brushwood lands, or re-
placed poor intercropped cereal lands previously sown within sparse rows of vines and
olive trees. The right columns in Table 5 clearly confirm that vineyard specialization en-
hanced the wealth of land –or the landesque capital in the term put forward by Amartya
Sen (1959) and Håkkanson and Widgren (2014). However, left columns highlight that
vineyards also required higher labour intensity, and this increased population densities
even more. Therefore per capita levels of agricultural income and wealth became the low-
est, besides being more evenly distributed. 
This feature coincides with the estimates made in mid-18th century France by François
Quesnay, who also attributed to the winegrowing peasant-owners the lowest non-wage
agricultural income in his Tableau Économique and other writings (Milanovic, 2010).
However, French winegrowers were mainly property-holders –exactly the same status that
Catalan rabassa tenants aimed to earn some day through their collective struggle. Com-
pared with their French counterparts, the Catalan winegrowing emphyteutic tenants could
only be considered as would-be peasants. Nevertheless, their legal and actual status was
also clearly stronger than many other tenants-at-will, or labour-tenants, that existed in sev-
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eral regions of Europe at the time, such as the statartorpare in Sweden, husmennene in
Norway, husmaendene in Denmark, or heuerlinge in Northwestern Germany (Morner,
1970). Unlike the German heuerlinge-system (Schlumbohm, 1996), for example, that left
the disinherited layers of the rural society at the mercy of landowners’ will, the Catalan
rabassa winegrowers were entitled with a temporary ownership over the vines they had
planted as long as they were kept alive (Giralt, 1965; Balcells, 1980; Carmona & Simp-
son, 1999; Simpson, 2011; Colomé, 2013; Colomé, Planas & Valls-Junyent, 2015; Gar-
rido, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c).
TABLE 5
Average income per person and unit of agricultural land in Spanish reales,
according to cluster land-use groups and population in the municipalities of the
province of Barcelona, 1852-58
Group N Mean Income Mean Income corrected Income / ha Income corrected / ha
1 15 857.7 1,916.7 819.9 3,483.4
2 30 631.9 1,933.9 163.1 849.6
3 5 1,010.8 2,172.7 333.0 1,064.1
4 20 991.0 1,985.3 333.0 1,789.2
5 8 1,363.9 1,945.9 632.4 3,065.8
6 20 1,984.6 2,033.5 43.2 175.3
7 51 1,009.3 2,038.0 87.9 362.8
8 37 1,214.8 2,080.9 50.4 191.2
9 14 1,111.1 2,026.4 64.6 269.0
10 48 1,441.0 1,996.0 43.6 213.3
11 26 1,078.8 2,370.4 203.5 613.6
12 18 869.4 1,987.6 192.4 897.8
Total 292 1,144.4 2,043.7 169.7 748.5
Source: our own, from the same historical sources referred in Figure 1 and Table 2.
During the 19th century many precarious heuerling-tenants emigrated from North-west-
ern Germany to the United States, while most Catalan rabassa-sharecroppers fiercely
fought with the landowners to stay in the land and become wholly owners of it. In Albert
Hirschman terms, the former had to take the “exit” option while the latter could raise their
“voice” to organize collective action (Hirschman, 1970). By transforming into vineyards
a previous landscape of brushwood, forest and poor cereal crops, these rabassa tenants
not only opened a room for themselves among the Catalan rural communities. They also
gained a place in society and a share of its income (Garrabou, Tello & Cussó, 2008;
Garrabou et al., 2009). By increasing population numbers and deepening the home mar-
ket, this eventually helped to turn Catalonia into a late-modern industrious society
179Historia Agraria, 76   Diciembre 2018   pp. 157-188
Land-use and rural inequality profiles in the province of Barcelona in mid-nineteenth century
RHA76__Maquetación HA  31/10/2018  10:09  Página 179
Enric Tello and Marc Badia-Miró
180 pp. 157-188   Diciembre 2018   Historia Agraria, 76
(Vries, 2010; Marfany, 2012) and an early-contemporary industrial economy (Valls-Jun-
yent, 2004; Badia-Miró & Tello, 2014).
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Despite the initial high degree of contingency found in the spatial location of Theil indices
(Figure 1), and the lack of a simple correlation between inequality indices and other vari-
ables tested, we have found some relevant land-use patterns of inequality in personal agrar-
ian wealth or income distribution in the municipalities of the Barcelona province in mid-
19th century. These land-use profiles of agrarian income inequality have been confirmed
and enhanced by correcting Theil indices of estimated income distribution for all the male
adult population, and applying the inequality possible frontier (IPF) approach to com-
pare the Inequality Extraction ratio (IER) with the maximum attainable one. 
The corrected results confirm that agrarian income inequality was lower in wine-
growing municipalities while, at the same time, underline the higher inequality of those
mainly forestry municipalities that were on average already apparent before the correc-
tion of the sample and the introduction of the IER index. Those mainly forestry munic-
ipalities where the more unequal, and the highly populated winegrowing ones were the
least in spite of attaining higher population densities, developing a commercial vineyard
specialization, and increasing the total wealth above a subsistence line could have also
meant an extended frontier (IPF) of possible inequality through a greater extraction ra-
tio (IER) exerted by an agrarian elite. This outcome can be interpreted as a historical pro-
cess of socioeconomic and political empowerment achieved by the Catalan rural class of
winegrowing tenants thanks to the long-lasting social fight they waged from the 18th cen-
tury up to the outbreak of Spanish Civil war in 1936 (Badia-Miró & Tello, 2014; Tello &
Badia-Miró, 2015; Colomé et al., 2016). 
In this sense, the statistical cross-section analysis conducted with a remarkably large
database of more than 86,000 recorded taxpayers in 292 municipalities has provided for
the first time solid quantitative answers to a set of questions posed for a long time by Cata-
lan rural historians. Our results also reinforce the ideas of those who argue that, beyond
the undeniable impact of purely economic factors, the historical path followed by wealth
and income distribution moves between greater degrees of freedom under a strong in-
fluence of many social, cultural and political forces (Atkinson & Piketty, 2007). As Paul
Krugman (2009) or Joseph Stiglitz (2012) have pointed out, changes in social values, po-
litical regulations, institutions and politics matter (Garrabou, Ramon-Muñoz & Tello,
2015).
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ANNEX
TABLE A1
Number of taxpayers in the Distribution of Personal Wealth in Real Estate
Ownership of 1852 in the province of Barcelona 
Districts of the province taxpayers
of Barcelona All With less than 2,000 reales % With less than 1,500 reales %
Barcelona 11,940 7,642 64.0 7,004 58.7
Arenys 6,774 6,161 91.0 5,980 88.3
Berga 3,657 2,970 81.2 2,820 77.1
Granollers 8,384 7,608 90.7 7,447 88.8
Igualada 9,852 9,055 91.9 8,785 89.2
Manresa 9,561 8,796 92.0 8,601 90.0
Mataró 5,326 4,748 89.1 4,576 85.9
Sant Feliu de Llobregat 8,673 8,021 92.5 7,834 90.3
Terrassa 8,276 7,659 92.5 7,491 90.5
Vic 7,356 6,430 87.4 6,242 84.9
Vilafranca del Penedès 6,500 5,676 87.3 5473 84.2
Province of Barcelona 86,299 74,766 86.6 72,253 83.7
Source: our own, from the Distribution of Personal Wealth in Real Estate Ownership of 1852 in the province
of Barcelona (Library of the Universitat de Barcelona, reference 146-1-II/13).
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TABLE A2
Taxes paid and tax burden of taxpayers above and below an attributed cadastral
income of 2,000 reales a year in the province of Barcelona, according
to the Distribution of Personal Wealth in Real Estate Ownership of 1852
(in reales a year or percentaje)
Districts of the province Estimated cadastral Taxpayers with more than 2,000 reales
of Barcelona income of all taxpayers Estimated cadastral % of all income Taxes % of all % of tax 
income attributed paid taxes paid burden 
Barcelona 40,745,709 36,242,839 88.9 4,447,032 87.4 12.3
Arenys 5,918,547 3,362,731 56.8 513,458 55.6 15.3
Berga 5,061,354 3,708,250 73.3 541,062 68.5 14.6
Granollers 7,774,228 5,178,452 66.6 812,785 66.3 15.7
Igualada 6,778,104 3,579,993 52.8 629,203 50.2 17.6
Manresa 6,933,038 4,343,674 62.7 755,428 60.5 17.4
Mataró 5,076,673 2,980,214 58.7 472,361 57.0 15.8
Sant Feliu de Llobregat 6,555,209 3,710,259 56.6 606,685 55.1 16.4
Terrassa 6,571,379 3,781,913 57.6 580,909 57.3 15.4
Vic 6,994,514 5,110,590 73.1 1,039,174 72.2 20.3
Vilafranca del Penedès 7,038,780 4,895,405 69.5 890,345 68.2 18.2
Province of Barcelona 105,447,534 76,894,320 72.9 11,288,442 69.6 14.7
Districts of the province Estimated cadastral Taxpayers with less than 2,000 reales
of Barcelona income of all taxpayers Estimated cadastral % of all income Taxes % of all % of tax 
income attributed paid taxes paid burden 
Barcelona 5,087,106 4,502,870 11.1 640,074 12.6 14.2
Arenys 923,500 2,555,816 43.2 410,042 44.4 16.0
Berga 790,410 1,353,104 26.7 249,348 31.5 18.4
Granollers 1,225,356 2,595,776 33.4 412,571 33.7 15.9
Igualada 1,252,699 3,198,111 47.2 623,496 49.8 19.5
Manresa 1,249,441 2,589,364 37.3 494,013 39.5 19.1
Mataró 829,013 2,096,459 41.3 356,653 43.0 17.0
Sant Feliu de Llobregat 1,100,946 2,844,950 43.4 494,261 44.9 17.4
Terrassa 1,013,776 2,789,466 42.4 432,866 42.7 15.5
Vic 1,439,601 1,883,924 26.9 400,427 27.8 21.3
Vilafranca del Penedès 1,304,541 2,143,375 30.5 414,196 31.8 19.3
Province of Barcelona 16,216,389 28,553,214 27.1 4,927,947 30.4 17.3
Source: our own, from the Distribution of Personal Wealth in Real Estate Ownership of 1852 in the province
of Barcelona (Library of the Universitat de Barcelona, reference 146-1-II/13).
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